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JURISDICTION OF THE COURT 
The Utah Supreme Court has jurisdiction over this Petition for Review pursuant to 
Utah Code Ann. §78A-3-102(3) and Rule 14 of the Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure. 
STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES 
Whether the Utah State Tax Commission erred in denying Summit Operating, 
LLC a tax exemption from the state oil and gas severance tax by ruling that the word 
"started" in the phrases "production for development wells started after January 1, 1990" 
and "production for wildcat wells started after January 1, 1990" in Utah Code Ann. §59-
5-102(5) (2008) means "spudded" and does not modify the word production. 
STANDARD OF REVIEW 
Correction of Errors. Utah Code Ann. §59-1-610. 
(1) When reviewing formal adjudicative proceedings commenced before the [tax] 
commission, the Court of Appeals or Supreme Court shall: 
(a) grant the commission deference concerning its written findings of fact, 
applying a substantial evidence standard on review; and 
(b) grant the commission no deference concerning its conclusions of law, 
applying a correction of error standard, unless there is an explicit grant of 
discretion contained in a statute at issue before the appellate court. 
7 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
See also Savage Industries, Inc. v. Utah State Tax Com'n, 811 P.2d 664 (Utah 1991); 
SEMCO Industries, Inc. v. Auditing Div. of Utah State Tax Com'n, 849 P.2d 1167 (Utah 
1993). 
Because the Utah State Tax Commission's application of U.C.A. § 59-5-102(2) in 
this case is a conclusion of law, this Court should give no deference to the Commission's 
decision and apply a correction of errors standard. 
DETERMINATIVE STATUTES 
i 
Utah Code Arm. §59-5-102 (2004) Severance tax ~ Rate - Computation ~ Annual 
exemption ~ Tax credit - Tax rate reduction ~ Study by Tax Review Commission. 
< 
(5) A tax is not imposed under this section upon: 
(b) the first 12 months of production for wildcat wells started after January 
1, 1990; or 
(c) the first six months of production for development wells started after 
January 1, 1990. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE < 
a. Nature of the case 
I 
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• a iiikti uidei oi the Utah State Tax Commission 
issued .ii j^nuai 6, 201J. ^Record, 074; 
III I  11 in II in s i m l IPi i M ' ( k r ( l i l i e s 
i in DcteiiiHei 1 /. J\nv) me Aucmiiig iJiustoii «i imiir Utah Suite las * 'onmiissioii 
( ''Division") issi led a Stat i ltoi j Nc tic e tc I 'etitione i fc i: the period Jaiiucuj • 2008 
through December 31, 2008, in which it imposed addilio? a: severance tax in the amount 
of W ^ l ^ ' ' -nH :ntorc^ in the aiiour* ~ vi -N lor a total assessment of 
•i • i ' .-! VlMl \V\\ 
qualify for the six-month exemption in Utah Code Ann. §59-5-102 (1990). (R. 092) 
six-month tax exemption for review before the Utah State 'fax Commission. (R. 001 • 002) 
i MliiilIIIIIII tun Siiiiiinai'y Jinttfiinnil ,nnl J 
Memorandum in Support of its Motion for Summary I udgment asking the Commission to 
find that the w oi d "started" referred to the date which uriiiing on the Horsehead Point 18-
I Il natui al gas w ell began (R 012 021) 
On August 3, 2010, Petitioner filed Petitioner's Cross-Motion for Summary 
Judgment .iiull .i IIYh/iiioMiiiluiii in I ^ppn.sihun I Il )i\ isioifs Motion IL in Nummais 
Judgment and in Support of its Cross-Motion for Summary Judgment. (R. 026 - 041) 
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On August 16, 2010, the Division filed a Memorandum in Opposition of 
Petitioner's Cross-Motion. (R. 044 - 053) 
On August 17, 2010, the Utah State Tax Commission held a hearing in which 
Petitioner and Division had an opportunity to present oral arguments on their respective 
motions. Commission D'Arcy Dixon Pignanelli was present with Commissioners R. 
Bruce Johnson, Commission Chair, Marc B. Johnson and Michael J. Cragun not present. 
(SeeR. 099) 
The Utah State Tax Commission °ranted the Division's Motion for Summary 
Judgment and denied Petitioner's Cross-Motion for Summary Judgment on January 6, 
2011. (See Addendum B)
 { 
Petitioner then paid the additional six-months taxes for the well on January 25, 
2011. 
This Petition for Review followed. (R. 074) 
c. Disposition at Agency i 
The Utah State Tax Commission ruled 3 to 1 that "the Section 59-5-102(5)(c) 
exemption only applies to wells that were spudded after January 1, 1990" and granted the ( 
Division's Motion for Summary judgment and denied Petitioner's Cross-Motion for 
Summary Judgment. Petitioner was thereby denied a six-month exemption under the 
4 
severance tax rules. Commissioners R. Bruce Johnson, Commission Chair, Marc B. 
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Johnson and Michael J. O^ui i -<o pidered with Commissioner DWrey Dixon Pignanelli 
dissenting. 
RELEVANT FACTS WITH CITATION TO THE RECORD 
a. Ih i ! lofseht ;,nl Point IS 14 nntural gas well in San Juan County; Utah, 
identified as entit) numbei 60** L ami subicci to l;ederal Lease No IITU 40754 (flic 
"Well") was spudded on Ancm^ . > • i.- ik l) 
b. - ' )able of pi odi ici rig; nati u al gas on 
August 16, 1984. (R. 093) 
c. The Well \\tr- 'Mint IP" • »»• August 20 1Q84 after a flow test measuring 
natural gas flo w was con;. * . . 
d. Effecti\ • : % me Utah State Legislature enacted uCA §59-5-
67(6) (1984) which provided an "exemption r .>-. the payment (Toicupalu-r Sax imposed 
by "this article is allowed foi a period of six months following the first da.) of production. 
'! luuMiipliih lull itp\i\\ iiiiiL, I. vi II 'il.nli'J nlln th1 hninrv I 1984 HTedn c date 
of this act." (See R. 066:3 % ; ) 
e. In 1990, the Utah State Legislature enacted House Bill Nc » 110 \ v hich 
wildcat wells started after January 1, 1990" and the "first six months of production for 
development wells started after January 1, 1990." (Addendum. A) 
11 
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f. An original draft of the 1990 bill included the language "spudded" instead 
of "started"; however, the word "spudded" was intentionally removed and replaced with 
the word "started" before the bill was presented for enactment. (Addendum D) 
g. On June 1, 2006, Petitioner acquired an interest in the Well. (R. 067:1f 5). 
h. When Petitioner acquired the Well, it could not commercially produce 
natural gas because of its remote location and significant distance from a natural gas 
transportation pipeline and gas processing plant. 
i. Petitioner thereafter constructed a natural gas gathering system pipeline to 
the Well in 2007 at a cost of over $900,000.00. (R. 067: }} 5) 
j . The Well production of natural gas started for the first time on January 7, 
2008. (R. 097: Plaintiffs Exhibit #3, Sundry Notices and Reports on Wells) < 
k. On December 17, 2009, the Division issued to Petitioner a Statutory Notice 
for the period of January 1, 2008 through December 31, 2008, in which it imposed six 
months additional severance tax to Petitioner in the amount of $66,916.43 and interest in 
the amount of $2,089.99 for a total assessment of $69,006.42. (R. 092) 
1. Petitioner claimed that the Well was subject to either the twelve-month or 
six-month exemption. Respondent disagreed. 
m. Petitioner submitted the issue for review before the Utah State Tax ^ 
Commission. (R. 001-002) 
n. On July 22, 2010, Respondent submitted a Motion for Summary Judgment. 
I 
Petitioner submitted Petitioner's Cross-Motion for Summary Judgment. (R. 012-023). 
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o. A hearing wa^ held on AM^-SI ,7, -uiU, oelure the Utah State Tax 
Commission. (See R. 099) 
p. On January 6, JO I I the I hah State lax (. onunission issued an idei I'm (lie 
Respond* vt ri 1 nlJi I,< • that the six ;t i IC ntl i. exei i lptioi I oi il) applied to wells "spudded" after 
January 1, l y ^ . Commissioner D'Arcy Dixon Pignanelli dissented in the nrdei (See 
Addenduu: V 
q. Hits Mention lot \ic\ww fulluw e..t III) II1 ' () . ; 
SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT 
Utah Code Ann. 59-5-102(5)^; allows for a six-month exemption for wells like 
the Horeshead Point 18-44 which only began or starter p K.UU.OII alter Jai.»uai> M^ 
modifies the word production or is ambiguous. If the w ord "started" is ambiguous, it 
must be construed in a manner to conform w ith the intent of the Legislature The 
Legislature intended to stimulate a weak energy industry in Ihe Slalr ol I Hah Iv 
incentivizing companies like Petitioi iei: to in\ est in c il and gas wells which would have 
otherwise been uneconomu. Petitioner did invest substantial funds and provided jobs for 
residents of the State of Utah ii I oi dei to begin production of the W ell. 
1 7 
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DETAIL OF THE ARGUMENT 
The Supreme Court of Utah has provided specific guidance for the interpretation 
of tax statutes. In ExxonMobil v. Utah State Tax Commission, 86 P.3d 706 (Utah 2003) 
the Court stated: 
When we interpret a statute, we look first to the plain language. In re 
Worthen, 926 P.2d 853, 866 (Utah 1996). In doing so, we give all statutory 
provisions relevance and meaning independent of other provisions. Id. If 
we find ambiguity in the statute's language, we look to the legislative 
history and other policy considerations for guidance. Id. In the context of a 
taxation statute, our evaluation of ambiguous language also requires us to 
"construe taxation statutes liberally in favor of the taxpayer leaving it to { 
the legislature to clarify an intent to be more restrictive if such intent 
exists." County Bd. Of Equalization of Wasatch County v. Utah State Tax 
Comm'n, 944 P.2d 370, 373-74 (Utah 1997)(quoting Salt Lake County v. 
State Tax Comm % 110 P.2d 1131, 1132 (Utah 1989)). 
86P.3d7061fl4. 
In Parson Asphalt Products, Inc. v. Utah State Tax Commission, 617 P.2d 397, 
i 
398 (Utah 1980) the Court stated: 
Even though taxing statutes should generally be construed favorable to the 
taxpayer and strictly against the taxing authority, the reverse is true for 
exemptions. Statutes which provide exemptions should be strictly i 
construed, and one who so claims has the burden of showing his 
entitlement to the exemption. 
PARTI 
i 
The Plain Language of the Statute is Difficult if not Ambiguous 
4 
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In ruling against Petitioner, the Utah State Tax Commission chose to substitute the 
word "started" with the word "spudded" so that the relevant statute now reads for 
practical purposes: 
"A tax is not imposed under this section upon the first six months of 
production for development wells spudded after January 1, 1990." 
However, this is not how the statute reads. Instead, it provides for a severance tax 
holiday "for the first six months of production for development wells started after 
January 1, 1990." Utah Code Ann. § 59-5-102(5)(c) (emphasis added). Respondent chose 
to focus on the words "wells started" and thus, by substituting "spudded", choosing a 
point in time when a drill bit actually breaks the ground. If "wells started" were the entire 
statutory text, and "started" means "spudded", then Respondents would be correct. 
However, the word "started" is not statutorily defined and Petitioner could not find legal 
support, either in general definitions of those customarily used in the oil and gas industry 
where the word "started" means "spudded" and concludes that there is none. 
The word "start" has different meanings depending on the context of its use. 
Webster's Encyclopedic Dictionary of the English Language, Delux Edition, 1990, 
contains various definitions and uses of the word, which include, inter alia: "to 
experience the first stage of [something] for the first time or after a period of not 
experiencing it"; to perform or do the first stages of [an action, course, etc.] for the first 
time or after a period of not performing or doing it"; "to cause [someone] to become 
engaged in a specific course of action..." (emphasis added). In certain situations, 
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something can even start "after a period of not" experiencing it performing it or doing it 
according to the plain meaning of the word "start". Id. Obviously, one can start 
something once, and then, start it again after some delay. Petitioner submitted to 
Respondents that the actual definition of "start" alone was of little help in addressing the 
issue on appeal. The relevant question for the operative statue becomes when does a gas 
well like the Horsehead Point 18-44 natural gas well start. 
Respondents cited to the case of Vickers v. Peaker, 300 S.W.2d 29 (Ark. 1957) in 
choosing to have the word "started" mean "spudded". However, this case highlights the 
ambiguity of the term. It points out that a well can "start" at numerous points of time 
including, but not limited to, (a) when a person decides to drill the well at a particular 
location, or (b) when the well site is surveyed, or (c) when archeological clearance is 
made, or (d) when environmental requirements are satisfied, or (e) when the drilling 
permit is approved by the appropriate governmental authorities, or (f) when dirt work 
begins on the drill site, or (g) when the well is spudded, or (h) when the well actually 
begins commercial production of oil or gas. See Id. at 32. Respondents own case cited in 
its decision shows that the word "started" is ambiguous. Respondents therefore arbitrarily 
chose to make "started" mean "spudded" by choosing one of the points in the life of an 
oil or gas well where the well could start. 
Start has many meanings in the oil and gas industry. Start can refer to the flowing 
of hydrocarbons. The New Mexico Supreme Court noted that turnkey contracts in the oil 
and gas industry involve agreements where wells are completed, placed into production 
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and turned over in a state ready to start flowing hydrocarbons into tanks. Tot ah Drilling 
Co. v. Abraham, 328 P.2d 1083, 1091 (N.M. 1958). In Boyce v. Dundee Healdton Sand 
Unit, 560 P.2d 234 (Okla. Civ. App. 1975), wells started producing water rather than oil. 
Cases have also connected started with production. In the case of Musgrave v. Musgrave, 
103 SE 302, 311 (W.Va. 1920), the West Virginia court declared that the landlord-tenant 
relationship with oil and gas leases continued despite the starting of production from a 
well, suggesting that the starting of production is a crucial moment in the timeline of 
successful well development. Phases of oil and gas leases also start based on the 
beginning of production or the level of production. Palmer v. Bill Gallagher Enterprises, 
LLC, 240 P.3d 592, 592 (Kan. App. 2010). 
The Tax Commission and Division have overlooked an initial draft of House Bill 
No. 110 which actually contained the word "spudded" in the exact place where the word 
"started" is in the current statute; however, this word was specifically removed before the 
bill was presented. If the statute was unambiguous and the state legislature intended for 
the word "started" to mean "spudded", the word "spudded" would not have been 
specifically removed from the statute. Therefore, it is entirely reasonable that the word 
"started" was purposely intended not to mean "spudded". By holding that the word 
"started" means "spudded", Respondents have gone contrary to legislative intent and 
replaced the word "started" with the one word that the legislature did not intend to be 
used in the bill 
17 
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Moreover, other courts have ruled in the context of when an oil or gas well started 
that "started" and "spudded" are not synonymous. In the case of Hilliard v. Franzeim, 
180 So.2d 746 (La. 1965), Franzheim contended that Hilliard's contractual obligation to 
purchase an overriding royalty, which was conditioned on a well "to be started" within 
ninety days, meant that the well must be "spudded" within such period. Ruling against 
Franzheim and in favor of Hilliard, the court distinguished the terms, stating: 
We find no merit in the defendant's contention that the terms "started and 
"spudded" in the agreement were intended to be synonymous, so that the 
defendant was not obligated to buy the royalty unless the well was 
"spudded" in within the ninety days. < 
...the term to "spud in" has a well-defined meaning in the oil industry as 
the first boring of the hole in the ground, that is, the first actual penetration 
of the earth with a drilling bit; it has a distinct meaning different from other 
terms of the industry, such as to "commence to drill", which refer to the * 
first operations on the land preliminary to the actual drilling or supping in 
(citing numerous authorities omitted herein). 
180So.2dat747. 
1 
Simply stated, in the general definitions and also in oil and gas industry 
definitions, the words "wells started" have no plain meaning and are ambiguous. 
Consequently, under the guidance of ExxonMobil, supra, this Court must reject 
Respondents' assertion that "started" unambiguously means "spudded", and consider the 
context of the words in the entire statute, and if they are still susceptible to multiple 4 
interpretations, consider the legislative history. 
Petitioner submits that the reliance of Respondents on similar statutes of other 
I 
jurisdictions to substitute the word "started" with "spudded" is also misplaced. 
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Respondents cite the tax codes of Texas and Alabama to somehow support its argument 
that "wells started" means "wells spudded"; however, a careful review of those statutes 
reveals that those respective legislatures actually used the word "spudded" in the 
statutory text to qualify a well for severance tax credits. Of course a statute which uses 
the word "spudded" will relate to the time a well is spudded. Utah's statue, conversely, 
does not use the word "spudded". 
Furthermore, it is axiomatic and a long standing view that the local statute governs 
the meaning of oil and gas production tax in each state. See Lee Hill, State Taxation of 
Oil and Gas, 33 Texas L. Rev. 854 (1955); John H. Tippit, Property Taxation of Oil and 
Gas Interests, 24 Rocky Mt. L. Rev. 170 (1952). What Texas or Alabama do has little or 
no relevance to the interpretations of the Utah tax statutes, particularly as in this case 
where the words used are completely different. The cases cited by Respondent to support 
its "wells spudded" argument are also distinguishable from application because they 
simply offer no real guidance; neither the Utah tax statute nor the words "wells started" 
were ever at issue in any of them. 
The Utah State Tax Commission cited Parson Asphalt Products, Inc. v. Utah State 
Tax Commission, 617 P.2d 397, 398 (Utah 1980) in which this Court stated: 
Even though taxing statutes should generally be construed favorable to the 
taxpayer and strictly against the taxing authority, the reverse is true for 
exemptions. Statutes which provide exemptions should be strictly 
construed, and one who so claims has the burden of showing his 
entitlement to the exemption. 
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However, the Utah Supreme Court stated in the very next sentence of that case, 
"Notwithstanding the foregoing, there is also to be considered the over-arching principle, 
applicable to all statutes, that they should be construed and applied in accordance with 
the intent of the legislature and the purpose sought to be accomplished." Id. 
As this Court stated, ambiguity exists when there "is capable of more than one 
reasonable interpretation because of uncertain meanings of terms, missing terms, or other 
facial deficiencies". Wilson v. Johnson, 2010 UT App 137, 234 P.3d 1156, 1162 (Utah 
App.2010). 
i 
Based on the Tax Commission's own cases cited, the fact that the decision was not 
unanimous and the various definitions which the word "started" can have, "started" 
cannot be unambiguous as asserted by the Respondents and the Court must look to the 
legislative intent for the statute's meaning. 
PART II 
Legislative Intent Suggests that Commercial "Production" of the Well is the 
Operative Event for the Tax Exemption. 
< 
The language of the Utah statute relevant to this case was first enacted through 
House Bill No. 110 ("H.B. 110" herein) which continued the prior law of taxing the value 
of oil and gas from producing wells. Utah Code Ann. §59-5-102 & 103. H.B. 110, < 
introduced in the General Session of 1990, however, had a particular purpose which can 
be gleaned from its title of "Severance Tax Incentives for Petroleum Industry Recovery". 
4 
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The Division referred to Senate Bill No.51 to support its argument that the 
petroleum industry incentives are aimed at drilling and not production. This bill, 
however, was never enacted into law and is not the statute in question. Granted that 
drilling a well is necessary to creating a producing well, the obvious purpose of the 
severance tax legislation is to tax production and not tax drilling. This interpretation was 
clearly made by the Office of the Legislative Fiscal Analysis (the "Office") when 
reporting on the potential fiscal impact of H.B. 110 to the legislature. (Addendum D). 
"The fiscal impact of this bill would be to reduce the oil and gas severance tax collected 
by the state," analyzed the Office. (Addendum D). Additionally, the Office made it clear 
that "The purpose of the above changes in the severance tax is to stimulate oil production 
in the State." (Addendum D). 
H.B. 110 did many things, but it is obvious purpose was to incentivize an ailing oil 
and gas industry in the State of Utah. It added new definitions for "Development wells" 
and for "Wildcat wells" which clearly refer only to "producing" wells, see Utah Code 
Ann. §59-5-101 (1) and (14) respectively. It has been held that the term "producing well" 
does not include a well that has discovered oil and gas but does not produce either. 
Rogers v. Osborn, 152 Tex. 540, 261 S.W.2d 311 (1953). The severance tax is only 
applicable to oil and gas which is "produced" from a well. Utah Code Ann. §59-5-102(1). 
Petitioner submits that these distinctions are important in understanding the complete 
statutory context, and because common sense dictates that the primary incentive for the 
oil and gas producers, and also for the State of Utah, is rooted in the production of oil and 
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gas, not the spudding, drilling, testing or completing of a well. If a well is drilled but 
never produced, there has never been a taxable severance of the minerals from the ground 
and therefore, no tax of the severance. A well does not simply qualify for the severance 
tax holiday when it is spudded. It qualifies only when it is producing and therefore 
becomes subject to severance taxes as evidenced by harmonizing the clear language of 
the severance tax statute as required by ExxonMobil, supra. See also, State v. Bluth, 53 P3 
210 (Utah 2002) (if the Supreme Court finds a statutory provision that causes doubt or 
uncertainty in its application, the Court must analyze the act in its entirety and harmonize 
its provisions in accordance with legislative intent and purpose). 
Petitioner submits that "production" is the operative word in defining when a well 
"started", e.g. that "production for development wells", as opposed to merely "wells" is 
the class of words forming the adjective to define and qualify the verb "started" in this • 
statutory context. Indeed the Utah legislature could have used the word "spudded" or 
"spud date" instead of "started" but expressly chose not to do so. By elimination of the 
word "spudded" form the exact place in the statutory text where "started" was inserted, it 
seems obvious, if not conclusive, that the legislature did not intend the word "started" to 
mean when the drill bit turns to the right in the ground as advocated by Respondents. 
Based on the foregoing, Petitioner submits that it is a fair and accurate 
interpretation of the relevant statute to conclude that a severance tax holiday is provided 
for wells where the taxable (or commercial) production started after January 1, 1990. A 
well does not qualify for the tax holiday unless it is capable of producing, and cannot be 
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taxed until it is actually producing and the oil and gas is sold or deemed sold. Utah Code 
Ann. §59-5-102(1). The legislature wanted new drilling to occur, but it also wanted to 
increase production of oil and gas in Utah. The legislators must have been aware of that 
during the 1989 oil and gas industry recession as many wells capable of production (such 
as the subject Well) were "shut in" because it was not economical to produce them for 
various reasons. The word "production" means marketable oil or gas. Garcia v. King, 139 
Tex. 578, 164 S.W,2d 509 (Tex. 1942). As noted above, the amended note to the 
management and fiscal analysis (dated February 2, 1990) states, "The purpose of the 
above changes in the severance tax is to stimulate oil production in the State"(emphasis 
added). 
Additionally, as a practical matter, the statute accomplished its designs and intent 
through Petitioner by having a well which had been shut-in for over twenty years begin to 
produce hydrocarbons. Petitioner constructed a natural gas gathering system pipeline to 
the Well at a cost of over $900,000, employed citizens of the State of Utah to construct 
the system, employs staff to monitor the well and interpret data from the well head, 
employs individuals to market the hydrocarbons from the well etc. This work has not 
only supported production in the state and created jobs but has also provided tax revenue 
and economic benefits to the State Utah which would not have existed had the well 
remained shut-in. To interpret the statute as Respondents suggest would create the 
opposite effect for which the legislation was intended; it would create a disincentive to 
produce oil or gas from shut-in wells which have never been put into production such as 
91 
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the Horsehead Point 18-44 at issue in this case. By having tax incentives available to 
companies willing to risk capital on decades' old projects, the statute "stimulate[d] oil 
production in the State" as the Office of the Legislative Fiscal Analysis had asserted. 
CONCLUSION 
For the foregoing reasons, Petitioner, Summit Operating, LLC, respectfully prays 
that the ruling of the Utah State Tax Commission be reversed and Petitioner be allowed 
the six-month exemption from severance tax which it asserted. 
DATED this Z-^ day of A ^ f r ^ S T ,2011. 
remy C. ScMwendiman (12652) 
Summit Operating, LLC 
1245 E. Brickyard Rd., Ste 210 
Salt Lake City, UT 84106 
Telephone: (435) 940-9001 
jschwen@summitcorp.net 
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59-1-601. District court jurisdiction. 
(1) In addition to the jurisdiction granted in Section 63G-4-402, beginning July 1, 1994, the 
district court shall have jurisdiction to review by trial de novo all decisions issued by the 
commission after that date resulting from formal adjudicative proceedings. 
(2) As used in this section, "trial de novo" means an original, independent proceeding, and 
does not mean a trial de novo on the record. 
(3) (a) In any appeal to the district court pursuant to this section taken after January 1, 1997, 
the commission shall certify a record of its proceedings to the district court. 
(b) This Subsection (3) supercedes Section 63G-4-403 pertaining to judicial review of formal 
adjudicative proceedings. 
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59-5-101. Definitions. 
As used in this part: 
(1) "Board" means the Board of Oil, Gas, and Mining created in Section 40-6-4. 
(2) "Coal-to-liquid" means the process of converting coal into a liquid synthetic fuel. 
(3) "Condensate" means those hydrocarbons, regardless of gravity, that occur naturally in the 
gaseous phase in the reservoir that are separated from the natural gas as liquids through the 
process of condensation either in the reservoir, in the wellbore, or at the surface in field 
separators. 
(4) "Crude oil" means those hydrocarbons, regardless of gravity, that occur naturally in the 
liquid phase in the reservoir and are produced and recovered at the wellhead in liquid form. 
(5) "Development well" means any oil and gas producing well other than a wildcat well. 
(6) "Division" means the Division of Oil, Gas, and Mining established under Title 40, Chapter 
6. 
(7) "Enhanced recovery project" means: 
(a) the injection of liquids or hydrocarbon or nonhydrocarbon gases directly into a reservoir 
for the purpose of: 
(i) augmenting reservoir energy; 
(ii) modifying the properties of the fluids or gases in a reservoir; or 
(iii) changing the reservoir conditions to increase the recoverable oil, gas, or oil and gas 
through the joint use of two or more well bores; and 
(b) a project initially approved by the board as a new or expanded enhanced recovery project 
on or after January 1, 1996. 
(8) (a) "Gas" means: 
(i) natural gas; 
(ii) natural gas liquids; or 
(iii) any mixture of natural gas and natural gas liquids. 
(b) "Gas" does not include solid hydrocarbons. 
(9) "Incremental production" means that part of production, certified by the Division of Oil, 
Gas, and Mining, which is achieved from an enhanced recovery project that would not have 
economically occurred under the reservoir conditions existing before the project and that has 
been approved by the division as incremental production. 
(10) "Natural gas" means those hydrocarbons, other than oil and other than natural gas liquids 
separated from natural gas, that occur naturally in the gaseous phase in the reservoir and are 
produced and recovered at the wellhead in gaseous form. 
(11) "Natural gas liquids" means those hydrocarbons initially in reservoir natural gas, 
regardless of gravity, that are separated in gas processing plants from the natural gas as liquids at 
the surface through the process of condensation, absorption, adsorption, or other methods. 
(12) (a) "Oil" means: 
(i) crude oil; 
(ii) condensate; or 
(iii) any mixture of crude oil and condensate. 
(b) "Oil" does not include solid hydrocarbons. 
(13) "Oil or gas field" means a geographical area overlying oil or gas structures. The 
boundaries of oil or gas fields shall conform with the boundaries as fixed by the Board and 
Division of Oil, Gas, and Mining under Title 40, Chapter 6, Board and Division of Oil, Gas, and 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
Mining. 
(14) "Oil shale" means a group of fine black to dark brown shales containing bituminous 
material that yields petroleum upon distillation. 
(15) "Operator" means any person engaged in the business of operating an oil or gas well, 
regardless of whether the person is: 
(a) a working interest owner; 
(b) an independent contractor; or 
(c) acting in a capacity similar to Subsection (15)(a) or (b) as determined by the commission 
by rule made in accordance with Title 63G, Chapter 3, Utah Administrative Rulemaking Act. 
(16) "Owner" means any person having a working interest, royalty interest, payment out of 
production, or any other interest in the oil or gas produced or extracted from an oil or gas well in 
the state, or in the proceeds of this production. 
(17) (a) Subject to Subsections (17)(b) and (c), "processing costs" means the reasonable actual 
costs of processing oil or gas to remove: 
(i) natural gas liquids; or 
(ii) contaminants. 
(b) If processing costs are determined on the basis of an arm's-length contract, processing 
costs are the actual costs. 
(c) (i) If processing costs are determined on a basis other than an arm's-length contract, 
processing costs are those reasonable costs associated with: 
(A) actual operating and maintenance expenses, including oil or gas used or consumed in 
processing; 
(B) overhead directly attributable and allocable to the operation and maintenance; and 
(C) (I) depreciation and a return on undepreciated capital investment; or 
(II) a cost equal to a return on the investment in the processing facilities as determined by the 
commission. 
(ii) Subsection (17)(c)(i) includes situations where the producer performs the processing for 
the producer's product. 
(18) "Producer" means any working interest owner in any lands in any oil or gas field from 
which gas or oil is produced. 
(19) "Recompletion" means any downhole operation that is: 
(a) conducted to reestablish the producibility or serviceability of a well in any geologic 
interval; and 
(b) approved by the division as a recompletion. 
(20) "Research and development" means the process of inquiry or experimentation aimed at 
the discovery of facts, devices, technologies, or applications and the process of preparing those 
devices, technologies, or applications for marketing. 
(21) "Royalty interest owner" means the owner of an interest in oil or gas, or in the proceeds 
of production from the oil or gas who does not have the obligation to share in the expenses of 
developing and operating the property. 





(e) oil shale; 
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(f) tar sands; and 
(g) all other hydrocarbon substances that occur naturally in solid form. 
(23) "Stripper well" means: 
(a) an oil well whose average daily production for the days the well has produced has been 20 
barrels or less of crude oil a day during any consecutive 12-month period; or 
(b) a gas well whose average daily production for the days the well has produced has been 60 
MCF or less of natural gas a day during any consecutive 90-day period. 
(24) "Tar sands" means impregnated sands that yield mixtures of liquid hydrocarbon and 
require further processing other than mechanical blending before becoming finished petroleum 
products. 
(25) (a) Subject to Subsections (25)(b) and (c), "transportation costs" means the reasonable 
actual costs of transporting oil or gas products from the well to the point of sale. 
(b) If transportation costs are determined on the basis of an arm's-length contract, 
transportation costs are the actual costs. 
(c) (i) If transportation costs are determined on a basis other than an arm's-length contract, 
transportation costs are those reasonable costs associated with: 
(A) actual operating and maintenance expenses, including fuel used or consumed in 
transporting the oil or gas; 
(B) overhead costs directly attributable and allocable to the operation and maintenance; and 
(C) depreciation and a return on undepreciated capital investment.. 
(ii) Subsection (25)(c)(i) includes situations where the producer performs the transportation 
for the producer's product. 
(d) Regardless of whether transportation costs are determined on the basis of an arm's-length 
contract or a basis other than an arm's-length contract, transportation costs include: 





(vi) treating; or 
(vii) a process similar to Subsections (25)(d)(i) through (vi), as determined by the commission 
by rule made in accordance with Title 63G, Chapter 3, Utah Administrative Rulemaking Act. 
(26) "Tribe" means the Ute Indian Tribe of the Uintah and Ouray Reservation. 
(27) "Well or wells" means any extractive means from which oil or gas is produced or 
extracted, located within an oil or gas field, and operated by one person. 
(28) "Wildcat well" means an oil and gas producing well which is drilled and completed in a 
pool, as defined under Section 40-6-2, in which a well has not been previously completed as a 
well capable of producing in commercial quantities. 
(29) "Working interest owner" means the owner of an interest in oil or gas burdened with a 
share of the expenses of developing and operating the property. 
(30) (a) "Workover" means any downhole operation that is: 
(i) conducted to sustain, restore, or increase the producibility or serviceability of a well in the 
geologic intervals in which the well is currently completed; and 
(ii) approved by the division as a workover. 
(b) "Workover" does not include operations that are conducted primarily as routine 
maintenance or to replace worn or damaged equipment. 
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59-5-102. Severance tax -- Rate -- Computation - Annual exemption - Tax credit - Tax 
rate reduction -- Study by Revenue and Taxation Interim Committee. 
(1) (a) Subject to Subsection (l)(b), a person owning an interest in oil or gas produced from a 
well in the state, including a working interest, royalty interest, payment out of production, or any 
other interest, or in the proceeds of the production of oil or gas, shall pay to the state a severance 
tax on the basis of the value determined under Section 59-5-103.1 of the oil or gas: 
(i) produced; and 
(ii) (A) saved; 
(B) sold; or 
(C) transported from the field where the substance was produced. 
(b) This section applies to an interest in oil or gas produced from a well in the state or in the 
proceeds of the production of oil or gas produced from a well in the state except for: 
(i) an interest of the United States in oil or gas or in the proceeds of the production of oil or 
gas; 
(ii) an interest of the state or a political subdivision of the state in oil or gas or in the proceeds 
of the production of oil or gas; or 
(iii) an interest of an Indian or Indian tribe as defined in Section 9-9-101 in oil or gas or in the 
proceeds of the production of oil or gas produced from land under the jurisdiction of the United 
States. 
(2) (a) Subject to Subsection (2)(d), the severance tax rate for oil is as follows: 
(i) 3% of the value of the oil up to and including the first $13 per barrel for oil; and 
(ii) 5% of the value of the oil from $13.01 and above per barrel for oil. 
(b) Subject to Subsection (2)(d), the severance tax rate for natural gas is as follows: 
(i) 3% of the value of the natural gas up to and including the first $1.50 per MCF for gas; and 
(ii) 5% of the value of the natural gas from $1.51 and above per MCF for gas. 
(c) Subject to Subsection (2)(d), the severance tax rate for natural gas liquids is 4% of the 
value of the natural gas liquids. 
(d) (i) On or before December 15, 2004, the Office of the Legislative Fiscal Analyst and the 
Governor's Office of Planning and Budget shall prepare a revenue forecast estimating the amount 
of revenues that: 
(A) would be generated by the taxes imposed by this part for the calendar year beginning on 
January 1, 2004 had 2004 General Session S.B. 191 not taken effect; and 
(B) will be generated by the taxes imposed by this part for the calendar year beginning on 
January 1,2004. 
(ii) Effective on January 1, 2005, the tax rates described in Subsections (2)(a) through (c) 
shall be: 
(A) increased as provided in Subsection (2)(d)(iii) if the amount of revenues estimated under 
Subsection (2)(d)(i)(B) is less than the amount of revenues estimated under Subsection 
(2)(d)(i)(A); or 
(B) decreased as provided in Subsection (2)(d)(iii) if the amount of revenues estimated under 
Subsection (2)(d)(i)(B) is greater than the amount of revenues estimated under Subsection 
(2)(d)(i)(A). 
(iii) For purposes of Subsection (2)(d)(ii): 
(A) subject to Subsection (2)(d)(iv)(B): 
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(I) if an increase is required under Subsection (2)(d)(ii)(A), the total increase in the tax rates 
shall be by the amount necessary to generate for the calendar year beginning on January 1, 2005 
revenues equal to the amount by which the revenues estimated under Subsection (2)(d)(i)(A) 
exceed the revenues estimated under Subsection (2)(d)(i)(B); or 
(II) if a decrease is required under Subsection (2)(d)(ii)(B), the total decrease in the tax rates 
shall be by the amount necessary to reduce for the calendar year beginning on January 1, 2005 
revenues equal to the amount by which the revenues estimated under Subsection (2)(d)(i)(B) 
exceed the revenues estimated under Subsection (2)(d)(i)(A); and 
(B) an increase or decrease in each tax rate under Subsection (2)(d)(ii) shall be in proportion 
to the amount of revenues generated by each tax rate under this part for the calendar year 
beginning on January 1, 2003. 
(iv) (A) The commission shall calculate any tax rate increase or decrease required by 
Subsection (2)(d)(ii) using the best information available to the commission. 
(B) If the tax rates described in Subsections (2)(a) through (c) are increased or decreased as 
provided in this Subsection (2)(d), the commission shall mail a notice to each person required to 
file a return under this part stating the tax rate in effect on January 1, 2005 as a result of the 
increase or decrease. 
(3) If oil or gas is shipped outside the state: 
(a) the shipment constitutes a sale; and 
(b) the oil or gas is subject to the tax imposed by this section. 
(4) (a) Except as provided in Subsection (4)(b), if the oil or gas is stockpiled, the tax is not 
imposed until the oil or gas is: 
(i) sold; 
(ii) transported; or I 
(iii) delivered. 
(b) Notwithstanding Subsection (4)(a), if oil or gas is stockpiled for more than two years, the 
oil or gas is subject to the tax imposed by this section. 
(5) A tax is not imposed under this section upon: 
(a) stripper wells, unless the exemption prevents the severance tax from being treated as a 
deduction for federal tax purposes; 
(b) the first 12 months of production for wildcat wells started after January 1, 1990; or 
(c) the first six months of production for development wells started after January 1, 1990. 
(6) (a) Subject to Subsections (6)(b) and (c), a working interest owner who pays for all or part 
of the expenses of a recompletion or workover may claim a nonrefundable tax credit equal to 
20% of the amount paid. 
(b) The tax credit under Subsection (6)(a) for each recompletion or workover may not exceed 
$30,000 per well during each calendar year. 
(c) If any amount of tax credit a taxpayer is allowed under this Subsection (6) exceeds the 
taxpayer's tax liability under this part for the calendar year for which the taxpayer claims the tax 
credit, the amount of tax credit exceeding the taxpayer's tax liability for the calendar year may be 
carried forward for the next three calendar years. 
(7) A 50% reduction in the tax rate is imposed upon the incremental production achieved 
from an enhanced recovery project. 
(8) The taxes imposed by this section are: 
(a) in addition to all other taxes provided by law; and 
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(b) delinquent, unless otherwise deferred, on June 1 next succeeding the calendar year when 
the oil or gas is: 
(i) produced; and 
(ii) (A) saved; 
(B) sold; or 
(C) transported from the field. 
(9) With respect to the tax imposed by this section on each owner of oil or gas or in the 
proceeds of the production of those substances produced in the state, each owner is liable for the 
tax in proportion to the owner's interest in the production or in the proceeds of the production. 
(10) The tax imposed by this section shall be reported and paid by each producer that takes oil 
or gas in kind pursuant to agreement on behalf of the producer and on behalf of each owner 
entitled to participate in the oil or gas sold by the producer or transported by the producer from 
the field where the oil or gas is produced. 
(11) Each producer shall deduct the tax imposed by this section from the amounts due to other 
owners for the production or the proceeds of the production. 
(12) (a) The Revenue and Taxation Interim Committee shall review the applicability of the 
tax provided for in this chapter to coal-to-liquids, oil shale, and tar sands technology on or before 
the October 2011 interim meeting. 
(b) The Revenue and Taxation Interim Committee shall address in its review the cost and 
benefit of not applying the tax provided for in this chapter to coal-to-liquids, oil shale, and tar 
sands technology. 
(c) The Revenue and Taxation Interim Committee shall report its findings and 
recommendations under this Subsection (12) to the Legislative Management Committee on or 
before the November 2011 interim meeting. 
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59-5-103.1. Valuation of oil or gas — Deductions. 
(1) (a) For purposes of the tax imposed under Section 59-5-102 and subject to Subsection (2), 
the value of oil or gas shall be determined at the first point closest to the well at which the fair 
market value for the oil or gas may be determined by: 
(i) a sale pursuant to an arm's-length contract; or 
(ii) for a sale other than a sale described in Subsection (l)(a)(i)? comparison to other sales of 
oil or gas. 
(b) For purposes of determining the fair market value of oil or gas under Subsection (1), a 
person subject to a tax under Section 59-5-102 may deduct: 
(i) processing costs from the value of: 
(A) oil; or 
(B) gas; and 
(ii) (A) except as provided in Subsection (l)(b)(ii)(B), transportation costs from the value of: 
(I) oil; and 
(II) gas; and 
(B) notwithstanding Subsection (l)(b)(ii)(A), the deduction for transportation costs may not 
exceed 50% of the value of the: 
(1) oil; or 
(II) gas. 
(2) Subsection (l)(a)(ii) applies to a sale of oil or gas between: 
(a) a parent company and a subsidiary company; 
(b) companies wholly owned or partially owned by a common parent company; or 
, (c) companies otherwise affiliated. 
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78A-3-102. Supreme Court jurisdiction. 
(1) The Supreme Court has original jurisdiction to answer questions of state law certified by a 
court of the United States. 
(2) The Supreme Court has original jurisdiction to issue all extraordinary writs and authority 
to issue all writs and process necessary to carry into effect its orders, judgments, and decrees or 
in aid of its jurisdiction. 
(3) The Supreme Court has appellate jurisdiction, including jurisdiction of interlocutory 
appeals, over: 
(a) a judgment of the Court of Appeals; 
(b) cases certified to the Supreme Court by the Court of Appeals prior to final judgment by 
the Court of Appeals; 
(c) discipline of lawyers; 
(d) final orders of the Judicial Conduct Commission; 
(e) final orders and decrees in formal adjudicative proceedings originating with: 
(i) the Public Service Commission; 
(ii) the State Tax Commission; 
(iii) the School and Institutional Trust Lands Board of Trustees; 
(iv) the Board of Oil, Gas, and Mining; 
(v) the state engineer; or 
(vi) the executive director of the Department of Natural Resources reviewing actions of the 
Division of Forestry, Fire, and State Lands; 
(f) final orders and decrees of the district court review of informal adjudicative proceedings of 
agencies under Subsection (3)(e); 
(g) a final judgment or decree of any court of record holding a statute of the United States or 
this state unconstitutional on its face under the Constitution of the United States or the Utah 
Constitution; 
(h) interlocutory appeals from any court of record involving a charge of a first degree or 
capital felony; 
(i) appeals from the district court involving a conviction or charge of a first degree felony or 
capital felony; 
(j) orders, judgments, and decrees of any court of record over which the Court of Appeals 
does not have original appellate jurisdiction; and 
(k) appeals from the district court of orders, judgments, or decrees ruling on legislative 
subpoenas. 
(4) The Supreme Court may transfer to the Court of Appeals any of the matters over which 
the Supreme Court has original appellate jurisdiction, except: 
(a) capital felony convictions or an appeal of an interlocutory order of a court of record 
involving a charge of a capital felony; 
(b) election and voting contests; 
(c) reapportionment of election districts; 
(d) retention or removal of public officers; 
(e) matters involving legislative subpoenas; and 
(f) those matters described in Subsections (3)(a) through (d). 
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(5) The Supreme Court has sole discretion in granting or denying a petition for writ of 
certiorari for the review of a Court of Appeals adjudication, but the Supreme Court shall review 
those cases certified to it by the Court of Appeals under Subsection (3)(b). 
(6) The Supreme Court shall comply with the requirements of Title 63G, Chapter 4, 
Administrative Procedures Act, in its review of agency adjudicative proceedings. 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 




Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
BEFORE THE UTAH STATE TAX COMMISSION 
SUMMIT OPERATING, LLC, 
Petitioner, 
v. 
AUDITING DIVISION OF THE 
UTAH STATE TAX COMMISSION, 
Respondent. 
ORDER GRANTING AUDITING 
DIVISION'S MOTION FOR 
SUMMARY JUDGMENT AND 
DENYING PETITIONER'S CROSS-
MOTION FOR SUMMARY 
JUDGMENT 
Appeal No. 10-0119 
Account No. N2315 
Tax Type: Severance Tax 
Audit Period: 01/01/08 - 12/31/08 
Judge: Chapman 
Presiding: 
D'Arcy Dixon Pignanelli, Commissioner 
Kerry R. Chapman, Administrative Law Judge 
Appearances: 
For Petitioner: Mr. Thomas W. Bachtell, Attorney 
For Respondent: Mr. Clark L. Snelson, Attorney 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
On July 22, 2010, Auditing Division ("Division") submitted a Motion for Summary 
Judgment and a Memorandum in Support of its Motion for Summary Judgment. In its Motion for 
Summary Judgment, the Division asks the Commission to find that a natural gas well does not qualify for 
the six-month exemption from severance tax allowed under UCA §59-5-102(5)(c) (2008) where drilling, 
or "spudding," of the well began in 1983. Section 59-5-102(5)(c) provides a six-month exemption for 
"the first six months of production for development wells started after January 1, 1990." The Division 
specifically asks the Commission to find that the word "started" in Section 59-5-102(5)(c) refers to the 
date on which drilling begins on a well. 
On August 3, 2010, Summit Operating, LLC ("Summit" or "taxpayer") submitted 
Petitioner's Cross-Motion for Summary Judgment and a Memorandum in Opposition to Respondent's 
Motion for Summary Judgment and in Support of its Cross-Motion for Summary Judgment. In its Cross-
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Motion for Summary Judgment, the taxpayer asks the Commission to find that a natural gas well qualifies 
for the six-month exemption from severance tax allowed under Section 59-5-102(5)(c) where "taxable 
production" (i.e., production that is subject to severance taxation unless an exemption otherwise applies) 
did not begin until 2008. Specifically, the taxpayer asks the Commission find that the word "started" in 
Section 59-5-102(5)(c) refers to the date on which taxable production begins. 
On August 16, 2010, the Division submitted its Memorandum in Opposition to 
Petitioner's Cross-Motion for Summary Judgment. A hearing was held on August 17, 2010, at which 
time both parties had an opportunity to present oral arguments on their respective motions. 
STATEMENT OF UNDISPUTED FACTS 
1. On December 17, 2009, the Division issued a Statutory Notice to the taxpayer for 
the period January 1, 2008 through December 31, 2008, in which it imposed additional severance tax in 
the amount of $66,916.43 and interest (calculated through January 16, 2010) in the amount of $2,089.99, 
i 
for a total assessment of $69,006.42. I 
2. Part of the Division's assessment concerned the taxpayer's claim of the six-
month exemption provided in Section 59-5-102(5) for one of its natural gas wells identified as entity 
number 6031 (the "Well"). The Division determined that the Well did not qualify for the exemption that 
the taxpayer had claimed and assessed severance tax accordingly. 
3. The "spud date" of the Well (i.e., the date when the drill bit pierced the earth) is 
August 28, 1983. 
4. The Well was "completed" and capable of producing natural gas on August 16, 
1984. The completion process included "testing" the Well, part of which involved a "flow test" where 
natural gas was allowed to flow to measure production. A flow test was conducted on the Well on or 
about August 16, 1984. 
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5. The Well was shut-in on August 20, 1984, and remained shut-in for many years 
until the taxpayer purchased it. The Well is in a remote location. In 2007, the taxpayer constructed a 
natural gas gathering system pipeline to the Well at a cost of over $900,000. 
6. On January 7, 2008, the taxpayer began to produce natural gas from the Well 
that is subject to the severance tax unless an exemption applies. 
7. Effective January 1, 1984, the Legislature enacted UCA §59-5-67(6) (1984), 
which provided an exemption from the occupation tax (a precursor to the severance tax). Subsection 59-
5-67(6) provided, as follows: "An exemption from the payment of occupation tax imposed by this article 
is allowed for a period of six months following the first day of production. Such exemption shall apply 
only to wells started after the January 1, 1984 effective date of this act." 
8. In 1990, the Legislature passed House Bill No. 110 ("HB 110"), in which it 
provided an exemption from severance tax. Effective January 1, 1990, Section §59-5-102(2) (1990) 
provided, as follows in pertinent part: ) 
(2) No tax is imposed upon: 
(c) the first six months of production for wells started after January 1, 1984, 
but before January 1, 1990; 
(d) the first 12 months of production for wildcat wells started after January 
1, 1990; or 
(e) the first six months of production for development wells started after 
January 1, 1990. 
9. The audio record of the House Floor Debate for HB 110 is found at 
http://le.utah.gov. Utah HB 110, Gen. Sess. (Feb. 20, 1990). This record indicates that Representative 
Adams sponsored the bill in response to severe economic conditions affecting the oil and gas producing 
areas of Utah in 1990. He mentioned that the cost to drill a well in Utah was more than double the cost to 
drill a well in nearby states. He stated that the bill provisions, which include the "holiday" exemptions 
provided in Subsection 59-5-102(2) (1990), were intended to attract companies to produce more oil (and 
gas) in Utah. 
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10. In the enrolled copy of HB 110, the Legislature provided that the holiday 
exemptions of Subsection 59-5-102(2) applied to production for wells "started after January 1, 1990" 
(emphasis added). The same language was found in drafts of the bills dated January 12, 1990, December 
27, 1989, December 18, 1989, and November 24, 1989. The taxpayer, however, provided an undated 
draft of the bill in which the word "spudded" appeared instead of the word "started." In this draft, the 
holiday exemption applied to production for wells "spudded after January 1, 1990" (emphasis added). 
11. In 2004, the Legislature deleted Subsection 59-5-102(2)(c) (1990), which had 
provided an exemption from severance tax on "the first six months of production for wells started after 
January 1, 1984, but before January 1, 1990[.]" 
APPLICABLE LAW 
1. Under rule 56(c) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, a summary judgment 
shall be rendered "if the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file, 
together with the affidavits, if any, show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the 
moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law." Facts and inferences to be drawn by the 
Commission in the summary judgment proceeding must be viewed in the light most favorable to the party 
opposing the summary judgment. See Broadwater v. Old Republic Sur., 854 P.2d 527 (Utah 1993). 
2. Section 59-5-101(2008)1 provides severance tax definitions, as follows in 
pertinent part: 
(5) "Development well" means all oil and gas producing well other than a 
wildcat well. 
(27) "Well or wells" means any extractive means from which oil or gas is 
produced or extracted, location within an oil or gas field, and operated by one 
person. 
(28) "Wildcat well" means an oil and gas producing well which is drilled and 
completed in a pool, as defined under Section 40-6-2, in which a well has not 
been previously completed as a well capable of producing in commercial 
quantities. 
1
 The 2008 version of Section 59-5-102 is the law that applies to this case. Previous versions of 
this law appear in the Statement of Undisputed Facts section of this decision only to assist, if needed, in 
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3. Section 59-5-102(5) provides for certain exemptions from severance tax, as 
follows in pertinent part: 
(5) A tax is not imposed upon: 
(b) the first 12 months of production for wildcat wells started after January 1, 
1990; or 
(c) the first six months of production for development wells started after January 
1, 1990. 
DISCUSSION 
Is there any genuine issue as to a material fact that would preclude the Commission from 
answering the legal issue before it, specifically how to interpret the word "started" in Section 59-5-
102(5)(c) (2008). The taxpayer indicated in its brief and at the hearing that it is seeking a six-month 
exemption for the Well at issue. Subsection 59-5-102(5)(c) provides a six-month severance tax 
exemption for "development wells." However, taxpayer's Exhibit 4 suggests that the Well at issue may 
f be a "wildcat well." Subsection 59-5-102(5)(b) provides a twelve-month severance tax exemption for 
"wildcat wells." The phrase "started by January 1, 1990" is found in both Subsections 102(5)(b) and 
102(5)(c). As a result, the Commission's interpretation of the word "started" will have the same effect for 
both exemptions and will have the same impact on the Well at issue, regardless of whether it is a 
development well or a wildcat well. Accordingly, there is no genuine issue as to a material fact that 
would preclude the Commission from deciding the legal issue. 
In Parson Asphalt Products, Inc. v. Utah State Tax Commission, 617 P.2d 397 (Utah 
1980), the Utah Supreme Court explained that exemptions are narrowly construed and that the person 
seeking the exemption has the burden to show that they fall within the scope of the exemption. 
Subsection 102(5)(c) provides a severance tax exemption for "the first six months of production for 
development wells started after January 1, 1990." The taxpayer asks the Commission to find that 
"started" refers to the date that taxable production begins at a well. The Division asks the Commission to 
find that "started" refers to the date that the drilling, or spudding, of the well begins. Critical to the 
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Commission's interpretation is whether the word "started" modifies the word "production" or the word 
"wells." 
The majority are not convinced that the taxpayer's Well qualifies for the exemption. The 
majority believe that word "started" modifies the word "wells," the word it immediately follows, and does 
not modify the word "production." As a result, the majority does not agree with the taxpayer's 
conclusion that all wells whose production started after January 1, 1990 qualify for exemption. The 
majority agrees with the Division that the drilling, or spudding, of a well must have begun after January 1, 
1990 in order for the well to have been "started after January 1, 1990" and for it to qualify for the 
exemption.2 
The majority recognize that one of a number of drafts of HB 110 used the word 
"spudded" instead of the word "started." However, the majority does not find this fact to show that the 
Legislature did not intend the word "started" to mean "spudded" for purposes of the exemption. In 
conclusion, if a well is spudded after January 1, 1990, its production qualifies for a six-month exemption 
under Section 59-5-102(5)(c) (2008). In this appeal, the Well at issue was spudded in 1983. 
Accordingly, it does not qualify for a severance tax exemption under Subsection 102(5)(c). 
Kerry R. Chapman 
Administrative Law Judge 
2
 As an alternative, "started" could also be interpreted to refer to the first operations on the land 
preliminary to the actual drilling, in which case the word "started" would refer to events prior to the spud 
date. See Vickers v. Peaker, 300 SW.2d 29 (Ark. 1957) (in which the court ruled that a well was started 
prior to the spud date, referencing numerous pre-drilling events). However, the majority prefer not to 
interpret "started" to mean a date prior to the date on which a well was spudded. Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
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DECISION AND ORDER 
On the basis of the information presented by the parties, the Commission finds that the 
Section 59-5-102(5)(c) exemption only applies to wells that were spudded after January 1, 1990. 
Accordingly, the Commission grants the Division's Motion for Summary Judgment and denies the 
taxpayer's Cross-Motion for Summary Judgment. It is so ordered. 
DATED this 6th day of January, 2011. 
X ^ — 
R. Bruce Johnson ^ ^ • • • - • ^ 5 ^ \ Marc B. Johnson 
Commission Chair iv£v'"" "V%\ Commissioner 
£ c o ; ' . • ^ c OCA I 
I j. '. O L M - / " A & — ;*^~ 
^ X # V — \§j%~$pf 
Michael J. Cragun 
Commissioner 
DISSENT 
I respectfully dissent from my colleagues. 
The applicable law passed in 1990 with Substitute House Bill 110 reads "no tax is 
imposed on (e) the first six months of production for development wells started after January 1, 1990." 
A development well is defined as an oil and gas producing well. 
Analyst by the Office of Legislative Fiscal Analyst of Substitute House Bill 110 states, 
"The purpose of the above changes in the severance tax is to stimulate oil production in the State."3 
On August 14, 1984 a minimal amount of natural gas was flared to test the subject well, 
and then the well was shut-in, as declared on August 20, 1984.4 No more oil or gas was produced from 
the well following the one day test. 
I take administrative notice of this record available to the public on the Utah Legislature website. 
4 
Petitioner's exhibit four, which is a federal form filed with the State of Utah, Division of Oil, Gas 
and Mining. Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
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The subject well was shut-in for 22 years. After the Petitioner acquired the well in May 
2006, Petitioner invested $900,000 to build a pipeline to transport oil and gas from the subject well to 
market. Once the Petitioner had the pipeline in place, the Petitioner was able to start the well into 
production, which it did on January 7, 2008. 
A shut-in well is of no value to the State of Utah. It provides no jobs. A well in 
production can help fuel the economy which was also the intent of the bill as understood in listening to 
the audio of the legislative presentation of Substitute House Bill 110 (1990) on the floor of the House of 
Representatives by the sponsor Rep. Adams. 
We must always look first to the intent of the law. 
This is why the controlling word in the law is "production" and "start" modifies 
"production." The intent of the law was to get wells into production. 
I hold the subject well being started into production met the intent of the law. I would 
have granted the credit for the first six months of production starting January 7, 2008. 
&QAC^&jLrfsoy^ 
D'Arcy Dixon Pignanelli 
Commissioner 
Notice of Appeal Rights: You have twenty (20) days after the date of this order to file a Request for 
Reconsideration with the Tax Commission Appeals Unit pursuant to Utah Code Ann. §63G-4-302. A 
Request for Reconsideration must allege newly discovered evidence or a mistake of law or fact. If you do 
not file a Request for Reconsideration with the Commission, this order constitutes final agency action. 
You have thirty (30) days after the date of this order to pursue judicial review of this order in accordance 
with Utah Code Ann. §§59-l-601et seq. and 63G-4-401 et seq. 
KRC/10-0119.osj 
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February 2, 1990 
MANAGEMENT AND FISCAL ANALYSIS 
SUBSTITUTE 
H. B. 110 
AMENDED NOTE 
The fiscal impact of this bill would be to reduce the oil and 
gas severance tax collected by the State. There are three parts to 
the bill. The first part changes the severance tax rate from a 
flat rate to a graduated rate depending on the price of oil or gas. 
The second part gives a tax credit for "wildcat wells" and the 
third part gives a tax credit for recompletion or workover 
expenses. 
It is estimated that the following impacts would apply to each 
part: 
FY 1990 FY 1991 
Graduated rate v ($725,000) ($2,900,000) 
Wildcat Exemption (12,500) (50,000) 
Workover Credit (625,000) (2,500,000) 
Total ($1,362,500) ($5,450,000) 
These amounts would reduce the Oil and Gas Severance Tax in 
I he General Fund. 
The above impact was estimated at $20 per barrel. If the 
price drops to $14 per barrel the loss would double, if the price 
increases to $26 per barrel the loss would be cut in half. 
The Tax Commission estimates that it would require one 
additional auditor to work with this program at an annual cost of 
$50,000 from the General Fund. 
The purpose of the above changes in the severance tax is to 
stimulate oil production in the State. It is impossible to 
estimate what impact these incentives will actually have on the oil 
and gas industry in Utah. 
S0P 
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12 tertiary recovery* or a pressure EsainteftAnce .proJjfCJLi. 
13 Section 2. Heat ion 59-5-102, Utah Code Annotated 1953, as 
1A last amended by Chapter 4, Lavs of Utah 1988, ie amended to read; 
15 59-5*102. (1) (a) Every person owning an interest, working 
16 interest, royalty interest, payments out of production, or any 
17 other interest, in oil or gas produced froa a veil in the state, 
is or in the proceeds of the production, shall pay to the state a 
19 severance tax {jsjp^^^^-^^^^ based on value, at the well, 
20 of the oil or gas produced, saved, and sold or transported frocn 
21 the field t^here the substance was produced* 
22 1M ?he severance tax rate. far cil and gas is as follows! 
23 fi) 2% of the value tg>.,.to apd including the first £13,00 per 
24 barral for oil, and 3*75 per.rocf_for gasr 
«K&< 
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1 JAM 3%.,&f..;th& v&lvi® from $1:2.01 t h r o u g h Sl^.Oo p e r j s e r r e l 
2 f o r - o i l , , a n a ,$«..?€ th rough $l,*.5$. &££ mot..-. im-gmi. 
3 f i l l ) 4% of t h e v a l u e from §14*01 th rough $16.ft®. g a r b a r r e l 
4 fgr^ jsaJJL^^ jL^^  $*-$* through ss^w per peg for,..g»&Ljauafl 
5 Jti£L~53^^ P « b a r r a l for, 04} 
§ §£L4J&L^U^ 
7 E-ffeMI i,£l I f t h e o i l o r g a s i s sh ipped o u t s i d e t h e s t a t e , 
S t h i s c o n s t i t u t e s a s a l e , and t h e o i l o r gas i s s u b j e c t t o t h e 
9 s eve rance t a x , I f t h e . o i l o r gas i s s t o c k p i l e d , t h e t a x i s n o t 
10 a p p l i c a b l e u n t i l i t is s o l d , t r a n s p o r t e d , o r d e l i v e r e d , O i l o r 
11 gas s t o c k p i l e d f o r Bore t h a n two y e a r s however, i s s u b j e c t t o 
12' i^e'; s e v e r a n c e t aau 
13 (.2} Ho tattf i s ; ispossd- \ipons 
14 (a) the. - f i r s t $5j9^ibO---.miwi«»IIy- i& gross- v a l u e o f each-; w e l l 
IS- or., veilltsr ;as- d e f i n e d in-; t h i s . p a r t t to.- &e p r o r a t e d : among tfea ow.mer& 
16, i n p r o p o r t i o n t o t h e i r ; r e ^ p e e t i v e i n t e r e s t s i n t h e p r o d u c t i o n o r 
17 i n th^V/pro^eeds of- t h e - p r o d o e t i o n f 
1$ (&} s t r i k e r # e l l s > u n l e s s t h e #x«3ftpfc4'oft p r e s e n t s - : t h e 
I f s@v€^ra#e -tax $wm b e i n g ; t r e a t e d m * -deduct ion :for ^ e d e r a i . tag 
?..fl- piirf^geaf '(HH^H 
^^ {c) the first six months of production for veils started 
22 after January 1, 1SS4 [~*~] fcy£ before January 1. Iff9.01 
^
3
 I&L, .th« first twelve months of production for wildcat vellg 
2
* &Pn3&$$ after January 1, lg[9g.jf_or; 
2S jjfej^^l^jglr^t ®xx ffionths_p.f production for,development 
2£ welifi--SP.»ddg.di after January.. 1.. 1$30. 
~S~ 
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1 |3) A working In to rest ovnor who p a y s f o r all or p&rt of 
• 2 the 6jepgng0a of a. re^ottpiatign or worRoyer _lg entitled to a tax 
3 credit equal to 20%- of__the amount pald> ...Thg,., ta* credit shall 
4
 ^P-P-1^—^ag.^^^- -..fehY. «>evgr8nco tax liability or. the_working Interest 
5" ownar under this ch&pt&y £or tha taxable yesr In tfhich the 
6 racomplst i ion o r wprkpyar 1$ croflsplered,. 
7
 £<£*34J 1 ji Thes» taxetf aro m addition to all other ta^aa 
8 providodi by law nnd ars delinquent, unless otherwise defarred, on 
9 June I n*xt succeeding the calendar year when the oil or gag Is 
10 produced, saved, and sold or transported frojq the premises. 
11 t M f ] 15) With respect to The tax imposed by this chapter 
12 on #ach ov/nax- o£ oil or gaa or In the proceeds of tha production 
IS o£ thoaa substances px'oduce^ in the state, aach owner la liable 
14 for tha tax in proportion to the owner * a interest ^n tha 
15 production or in th« proceada or" the production* 
16 f{-5')l t£i Th<* fcflL* *^?»il ba peld by aach producer pursuant 
1? to agraajfoent on behalf o* the producer End on bahaif of each 
18 owner entitled to participate in th© oil or gas sold by the 
19 prodvcar or transported; by the producer from tha field where tha 
20. oil or gr&ar i« :prod#o«&-
it- £H£'I H i Bach' protocer shall, d&3o&£; the ta^c tjstm' t£m-
ZZ amounts &i*a to othsr &wmr& for .tha pz$$uct£&n or tha prooeeda .of 
23 t h a p^ofect lost . . 
24 S e c t i o n S» ffils,,_Act h a s : re t roap:aot iva o p e r s t i g m t o J a n u a r y 
as i^ , yw*, 
- « w 
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